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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

------------------------------------------------------------UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
Case No. 67678

vs.
SALVADOR P. TOSCANO, SR.,
:!Jefendant and
Appellant.

-------------------------------------------------------------APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action before the Utah Supreme Court to
review a decision of the Second Judicial District Court of
Weber County, State of Utah, which held that Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) payments of $2,921.00, given
to tho Appellant by the Respondent, were the result of
factual error since the payments would not have been made
had the Respondent known that the Appellant in fact owned a
home and real property in Texas; and which entered judgment
against the Appellant in accordance with Rule 54(c) (1) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure·.

Appellant contends that

he properly received the AFDC and that the State of Utah
does not have the right to collect i t back.

~ppellant

was

legally entitled to AFDC from the State of Utah under Responden
own regulations, Volume II Section 410 .1, and to deny Appellant
that legal entitlement is a violation of Appellant's due pro~s
and equal protection rights under the Utah Constitution and
theby the
Fourteenth
Amendment
of provided
the byUnited
Constitution.
Sponsored
S.J. Quinney Law Library.
Funding for digitization
the Institute ofStates
Museum and Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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DISPOSITION BY
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
The Defendant was ordered to pay back assistance he
received from the State of Utah in the amount of $2,921.00.
Case No. 67678 in the Second Judicial District Court of
Weber County.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the decision by the Second
Judicial District Court of Weber County and, in addition, an
award of retroactive benefits due.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, Salvador P. Toscano, Sr., is a migrant farmworker from Muleshoe, Texas.

In June of 1975 Appellant

brought his wife and eight of his eleven children to work
in the onion fields of Davis County, Utah.

Subsequently,

Appellant suffered a torn medial meniscus of the left knee
during his employment and was unable to pursue further work
in the onion fields or any other substantially gainful
employment.

Appellant was later in serious financial

difficulty and went to the Assistance Payments Administration
Office in Davis County to apply for aid.

An interview was

held between Appellant and an Assistance Payments Administration
non-Spanish speaking representative concerning Appellant's
eligibility for AFDC benefits.

At this interview it was

not asked whether Appellant owned a home.

Appellant was

given financial assistance which subsequently totaled
$2,921.00.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library.
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On June 15, 1977, Appellant was sued by the State of
Utah to collect the $2,921.00.

The Complaint stated that

Appellant had received the financial assistance by

fradulentl~

misrepresenting to Plaintiff that he did not have a home
in which he was not residing.
Appellant filed an Answer with the Second District
Court challenging the allegations made by the State of Utah.
On September 27, 1979, and October 1, 1979, Appellant appeared
with counsel at hearings before the Honorable Judge Calvin
Gould.

At those proceedings Appellant, through an interpreter

stated that he could not understand the
less read or write in English.

Engli~h

language, much

Throughout the hearings an

interpreter translated for the court and counsel, communicating with Appellant and his family in Spanish.

Appellant

stated that he was a migrant farmworker and that he stayed
in the State of Utah for the year of 1975 because of the
injury he sustained, but that in 1976 and the years that
followed, he migrated back and forth from Texas to Utah, and
to other states as well.

When questioned by counsel for the

State, Appellant stated that he did not understand most of the
questions asked by the Assistance Payments representative;
he was certain, however, that he was not asked whether he
owned a home in Muleshoe, Texas.

Appellant stated that he

did not misrepresent any issue to the Assistance Payments
Administration and that he did not know about the rules and
regulations with regard to financial assistance.
On October 1, 1979, Judge Calvin Gould rendered his
decision holding that the failure of Appellant to report the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-3Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

ownership of his home in Texas was not the result of fraud
or misrepresentation by Appellant.

The court found that

Appellant's primary language was Spansih and that his ability
to communicate in and understand English was severely limited;
that Appellant's failure to report ownership of the home and
real property in Texas was the result of lack of communication;
that Appellant's home in -Texas was not an exempt asset or
resource under Assistance Payments regulations; that Appellant's
ownership of the same made him totally ineligible for the
financial assistance he received;and that Respondent was
entitled to judgment against Appellant in accordance with
Rule 54(c) (1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on the basis of
factual error in the payment of monies, by Respondent, to
Appellant in the amount of $2,921.00.

This appeal to the

Utah Supreme Court followed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT WAS, AT THE TIME IN QUESTION, ELIGIBLE FOR
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE BECAUSE HIS HOME IS
EXEMPT UNDER VOLUME II SECTION 410.l OF THE UTAH
RULES.
Section 410.l of Volume II states:
§

1.

410.1 Exempt Assets
One home and lot owned or being purchased and
occupied by the applicant or recipient, including
a mobile home.
a.

If the home is owned or being purchased,
the lot on which the home stands shall
not exceed the average size of residential
lots for the community in which it is
located.
The amount of property exceeding
an average-size lot shall not be considered
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
exemot
oroperty.
Library
Services and
Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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b.

When an individual owns but does not occupy
a mobile home, the equity value of the mobile
home shall not be considered exempt personal
property.

It is important to note that for financial assistance
I

a home and lot must be occupied by the applicant before it i
exempt.

There has never been any question as to Appellant's

occupying his home in Muleshoe, Texas.

Appellant is a

migrant farmworker and uses his home in Texas as a home base
when he travels all over the Southwest and Northwest to do
agricultural work.

µe is required to travel great distances

from his home base in Texas, however, he does leave his home
occupied.

Appellant owns only one home and pays taxes on it

Because he and his family return to their home periodically
during the year, he does not rent his home and does not
collect any income from it.

In December, 1975, when Appella

applied for financial assistance and during the months
Appellant received the financial assistance, Appellant
occupied the home and lot .in Muleshoe, Texas, although he
was not temporarily there.

It is pointed out that Volume II

does not define the term occupied, but it is submitted that
the general dictionary definition is applicable and Appellan
did "occupy"· the home.
The case of Independent Fire Insurance Company v.
Butler, 362 So. 2d 980

(1978), held that "occupancy"

was largely a matter of intent and that a home did not need
a continuous bodily presence of individuals in order
to be occupied.

Furthermore, the case of Independent

5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Fire Insurance Company defined the term "occupied" to mean
a dwelling in actual use by human beings who lived therein
as their place of habitation.

In the case of National Security

Fire and Casualty Company v. Richard Lee James, 358 So. 2d
737

(1978), the court stated that "unoccupied" means without

occupants or animate objects; a dwelling is unoccupied when
it is ceased to be used as a place of abode or residence by
people.

The Appellant in the case at bar legally "occupied"

his home in Texas under the elements set out in aforementioned
cases.
The Appellant is a migrant Earmworker and at all times
intended his home to be located in Muleshoe, Texas,and although
there was not a continuous bodily presence of Appellant in
his home, his home was and continues to be occupied by his
children and Appellant; and at all times Appellant's home in
Muleshoe,

~exas,

has been used as the Appellant's place of

abode and residence.
In the case of Macomber v. State Social Welfare Board,
346 P.2d 808 (1968), the court held that under statutes
providing that real property owned but not occupied by a
state old age security recipient shall be utilized to provide
for the recipient's needs, regulations which required the
recipient to sell a lot next to her home were void in that
"utilize" did not include a sale; the recipient was entitled
to retain real property even though it was not feasible to
utilize it for her needs, and her transfer of that property
to charity, with retention of life estate, did not render
her ineligible to receive payments.

In the case at bar, the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
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court should take a liberal approach in determining whether
Appellant in fact "occupied" his home in Muleshoe, Texas,
and find as the court did in Macomber.
The Utah law regulating public financial assistance
was enacted for the purpose of promoting the general welfare
of all individuals.

Appellant was working in the fields

of Ut~h doing agricultu~ai wdrk when he was injured.
This injury subsequently forced him to seek financial assistanc
At all times he "occupied" his home in Muleshoe, Texas, and
this court should

find~accordingly.

~lthough

the line of

demarkation is incapable of precise definition, the courts
have given general welfare laws a liberal construction with
a view toward accomplishing its highly beneficent objectives.
United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948). Brazons

~ivar

Conservation & Reclamation Dist. v. Castello, 135 Tex.307,
14 3

s .w. 2d

5 77 ( 19 4 0 ) .

It is important to note that for food stamp assistance
purposes the Appellant's home was exempted and he was able
to receive public assistance.

Basically, public financial

assistance and food stamp assistance are the same, both are
governed by federal and state regulations together, which
may often be integrated and cross-applied.

Where general finanl

assistance regulations do not adequately define the situation

1

at hand, the food stamp assistance regulations may provide
1

guidance that is equally applicable to financial assistance,
since the two different forms of assistance and their
governing regulations are so much alike.

-7-
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Food stamp assistance is governed by Volume IV of the
state regulations, and the applicable Sections in this case
are 304.21 and 680.3 (presently 680.5).

They state:

§304.21 (Exempt Resources) Home and Lot.
The home and lot normal to the community.
§680.3

Verification of Migrant Resources:

Special care sh9uld be taken in dealing with
migrants to qetermine if there are out-ofState resources or income from real property
in the home-base area.
For example, a Migrant
who claims Texas as a home-base area and who
is applying for food stamps in Utah, should be
questioned as to the availability of resources
in Texas as well as Utah.
Particular attention should be paid to real
property in the home-base area. Each applicant
household is permitted one home and lot as an
exemption from resources.
If the applicant has
a home and lot in Texas and does not own a
residence in Utah, the Texas home will be
exempted as a resource ....
As noted, Volume IV of the food stamp regulations provide
specific rules for migrant workers.

As transients, migrant

farmworkers can readily apply for food stamp assistance, and
the policy of the welfare laws and regulations is to expedite
their receiving this type of public assistance benefit.
Hence, special sections are promulgated in Volume IV which
apply only to migrants.

The intent of the Volume IV

regulations is to allow migrants the right to own a home
in another state and consider it an exempt resource.
Appellant was legally entitled to receive food stamps under
the Utah rules because his home was considered an exempt
resource; the same should hold true for the financial
assistance that Appellant received.
-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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For both food stamp assistance and financial assistance
the home and lot belonging to Appellant was exempt; for
financial assistance purposes the home and lot were occupied
by the applicant as required under the Utah rules.

Since

the financial assistance rule does not specifically treat
the situation of a migrant, but the goal of both rules is
the same, therefore, the example of a.migrant who owns a
home in Texas and works in Utah (Volume IV §680.3) provides
applicable guidance in defining the meaning of "occupied" in
this situation, for purposes of financial assistance as
well.

7.':.l though Volume II does not have any special regulatio

covering migrants, migrant status is relevant in determining
financial assistance.
therefore an issue.

Whether an applicant was a migrant is
As a migrant farmworker, Mr. Toscano was

eligible for the financial assistance that he received.
POINT II
APPELLANT DID NOT UNDERSTAND THAT HE HAD TO
REPORT OWNERSHIP OF HIS HOME IN TEXAS, DID
NOT WILLFULLY WITHHOLD THE INFORMATION, AND SHOULD
NOT BE HELD LIABLE THEREFOR.
Appellant did not understand the questions concerning his
resources because of his limited ability to communicate in
the English language.

The District II-A office of the

Assistance Payments Administration was not staffed with
personnel who spoke fluent Spanish, and one of

~ts

staff

did assist Appellant in filling out his application for
assistance.

Appellant did not understand the questions he

was being asked by Respondent's representative at the time he
applied for benefits.

The Appellant did not withhold infor-

mation material to his eligibility; and the Appellant received!

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

j

financial assistance because of a lack of communications
as found by the lower court.
Califano,

The case of Jacobo Garcia v.

No. 77-422(D.N.J. 1977), should therefore apply.

That case involved a Spanish-speaking individual who received
Social Security Disability benefits and an attempt by the
government to recover an overpayment.

Whether the recipient

of an overpayment of Soc{al Security Disability benefits was
at fault and could be required to repay the extra funds depended
upon whether he knew or should have known ·that he was receiving
an overpayment.

With~n

a period of several weeks, the

recipient had accepted two checks, each for $3,138, one of
which constituted an overpayment.

Although the overpayment and

the recipient's entitlement in general had been explained
in letters sent to him by the Social Security Administration,
he was unable to read them because he was literate only in
Spanish. The court held that the government could not
recover an overpayment of disability benefits from any
recipient who was found without fault in regard thereto.
The record in the case at bar shows that Appellant was
without fault in regard to overpayment of benefits, and he
should not be required to pay back those payments he received
from the Assistance Payments Administration.
On a further note, it is against the public interest to
congest the courts with trivial, perhaps meaningless, and
even counterproductive lawsuits like the one presented by
Respondent in this case.
The attempts to collect the $2,921.00 overpayment from
Appellant have continued for almost three years, at considerable
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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expense to the public.

The Court should rule in Appellant's

favor if for no other reason than to provide an example for
those with authority to decline collection of future overpayments in similar circumstances.

At least a future waste of!

public money could be avoided.
Not only is it highly questionable whether collection
efforts recover enough overpayments to

~ay

for the administra-

tion and legal costs involved in such activity, it is all the
more questionable whether blameless households are a desirable
target of collection proceedings.

In proceeding against those

households, the State is treating those innocent of any
wrongdoing exactly the same as the outright welfare chisler.
This indiscriminate grouping breeds disrespect for the law
and the State agency, which will ultimately hinder enforcement not only of recovery provisions, but of the underlying
provisions for proper receipt of financial assistance.

A

previously innocent recipient could easily be converted into
a welfare chisler.

When one realizes that by coming forward

with information indicating an overpayment he may precipitate
his own prosecution and repayment obligation, he could very
well feel compelled to remain silent.

Then the error might

never be corrected, and overpayments might continue indefiniU
Until the blameless are encouraged to come forth with material
information, rewarded rather than being punished equally with
the blameworthy, public officials cannot assume to build
respect for the law or the governmental agency charged with
its enforcement.
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A further policy reason for exercising power to decline
collection carries greater weight than the State's interest in
cutting costs - the need to permit recipients to become
self-supporting.

Collection robs those with only enough

income to meet fixed living expenses of their only chance to
achieve a standard of living that approximates minimum
subsistence.

Having relied on financial assistance later

claimed as an overpayment, a household has spent that money
on medical bills and other necessary living expenses, not
incurred because of the receipt of the financial assistance.
To then require repayment means that the household will
incur further debts for living expenses.

Therefore, a

primary and overriding consideration relative to the public
interest in exercising the power to decline collection is the
balance of costs involved in attempting to collect from faultless households and the

~enefits

derived from such attempts.

The State will pursue an innocently overpaid household through
legal proceedings at great expense in time, effort, other
resources, and ultimately money to both parties, the courts,
and ultimately the public, when the net result is but an unenforceable judgment against a household with little resources.
Even if a repayment agreement can be structured to a household's
marginal income, this too involves the expense of monitoring
and enforcement.

Furthermore, it :aay stretch the household's

budget to a breaking point, 1eopardizing its ability to secure
the basic necessities of life.
Indeed collection punishes the wrong party, such that
-12-
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principles of equity cqmpel the declination of collection.

It

must be remembered that the Appellant who has been overpaid
due to innocent error never requested, either expressly or
impliedly, financial assistance to which he was not entitled.
He did not apply for finanical assistance to which he was not
entitled nor even assent to, financial assistance to which
he was not entitled when he received it, because he did not
know he was not entitled to the assistance when he received
it.

Therefore the Defendant was not put on notice when he

received the financial assistance that he would be obligated
to repay it.
Nor did the State expect to be repaid when it issued
the financial assistance.

When the household is without

fault, the agency must accept responsiblity for an erroneous
overpayment.

Placing the obligation on recipients for over-

payments reduces the agency's motivation to correct or
eliminate errors, since the agency knows it can require the
recipients to repay.

Accountability should be placed where

fault lies, so that the problem can be arrested at its
source.

Stopgap measures will never be totally effective

in eliminating mistakes.
~Co

summarize, those who are, currently subject to recovery

or recoupment are perhaps the most faultless:

those who

have made an effort to become self-supporting, to have
enough income other than public benefits from which the State
can recover; and those who have been persuaded by moral
compulsion to agree to repay from their current benefits.
Then remain those from whom recovery is impossible.
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If the

agency were

encou~aged

to prevent errors, however, rather than

discovering errors after the fact, then the State would not
suffer the loss in these situations.

Therefore the public

interest requires that the Plaintiff decline collection from
faultless households such as Appellant.
POINT III
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL PRECLUDES
THE STATE'S COLLECTION ACTION.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is based upon public
policy, fair dealing, good faith, and justice.
2d Estoppel §28 (1966).

28 Am. Jur.

Generally, the doctrine holds a

person to a representation made or position assumed where
otherwise inequitable consequences would result to another, who,
having the right to do so, has in good faith relied on the
representation or position and been misled to his injury.
Traditionally, the doctrine has been involved in circumstances of fraud, been characterized as very harsh, and
consequentlly not been favored.

But recently the techni-

calities incident to estoppel have given way to practical
utility, and the doctrine has been extended to unconscionable
or inequitable situations, as a means of preventing injustice.
The elements of equitable estoppel are set forth in
Lucide v. Rippato, 73 Cal. App. 3d 1, 140 Cal. Rptr. 535,
542 (1977), quoting from Strong v. County of Santa Cruz, 15
Cal. 3d 720, 725, 543 P.2d 264

(1975).

The facts of the

present case satisfy those elements.
(1)

The party to be estopped must be apprised to the
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facts.

The State's Assistance Payments Administration

was unaware of all relevant facts or could have been through
reasonable diligence.

~~e

Appellant supplied all information

that the State requested of him.
(2)

The party to be estopped must act so that the party

asserting estoppel has a right to believe the action was
intended to be relied upon.

7he State's Assistance

Payments Administration should reasonably have expected
the Appellant to rely on its determination of his eligibility.
(3)

The party seeking estoppel must be ignorant of

the facts.

The Appellant acted conscientiously, in good

faith, yet without any knowledge of administrative error.
(4)

The party seeking estoppel must rely on the action

to his injury.

The Appellant did rely on the State's determin

of his eligibility and will be injured if forced to repay
the overpayment.
It has been held that an act done or representaion
made through innocent error cannot be grounds for estoppel.
28 Ain. Jur. 2d Estoppel §44 (1966).

It could be contended

that either the State's Assistance Payments Administration or Appellant conunitted an innocent error making equitable
estoppel inappropriate.

But general principles of equity hold

that when one of two innocent parties must suffer a loss it
must be borne by the one who has rendered the injury possible
or who could have prevented it.
§62 (1966).

28 Arn. Jur. 2d Estoppel

The State determined the Appellant's eligibility

for financial assistance so that the Appellant reasonably
believed the determination was to be relied

~pon,

see (2),
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supra; thG Appellant did rely on the State's determination, by
acquiring the financial assistance for which he was determined
eligible, so that now he may suffer injury, see (4), supra.
Moreover, the State should reasonably have expected
the Appellant to rely on its determination of his eligibility,
see (2}, supra, so that it could have prevented any resultant
injury by making a correct determination.

It can also be

argued that the State was negligent and must take any
consequences of its own acts, because Appellant is non-English
speaking, yet the interview by the Assistance Payments
Administration was conducted in English.
The Restatement of Restitution §142 states in addition
that if a right to recover payment made through error does
exist, it may be defeated by a change of circumstances on the
part of the recipient.

As the New York Court of Appeals

stated:
Generally courts will look to see if a
benefit has been conferred on the Defendant
under mistake of fact or law, if the benefit
still remains with the Defendant, if there
has been otherwise a change of position by
the Defendant and whether the Defendant's
conduct was tortious or fradulent.
Generally if a Plaintiff's recovery will lead
to an undue net loss to the Defendant by
reason of a changed position, as will often
be the case when the funds have been disbursed,
then the parties being equally innocent,
recovery may be denied.
Paramount Film Distributing Corp. v. State, 30 N.Y. 2d 415,
285 N.E. 2d 695, 699 (1972), cert. den., 414 U.S. 829 (1973).
Here the financial assistance has been long since spent, and
Appellant changed his position by spending the assistance.
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Respondent is to blame for the overpayment, and it would be
inequitable for i t to take advantage of this situation.
Comment(c) to Restatement §142 also supports this
conclusion, by disallowing recovery where an erroneous payment
has been spent for living expenses and "such payment was
of such size that considering the financial condition of
the payee it would be inequitable to require repayment."
In the past, the use of equitable estoppel against the
government was held inappropriate or at best was severely
limited.

However,

the~

trend is to accept application of the

doctrine against the government.

Traditionally, whether the

doctrine was usable was dependent upon whether governmental
or proprietary functions were involved.

Equitable estoppel

was applicable against the state only when it acted in a
proprietary capacity.

However, the United States Supreme

Court has recognized that the governmental-proprietary

dis~

tinction is difficult to apply and therefore rejected use of th
governmental-proprietary distinction.
v. U.S., 350 U. S. 61
(1953).

Indian Towing Co.

(1955); Dahelite v. U.S., 346

u.

S. 15

Even in jurisdictions that still maintain the

governmental-proprietary distinction, the trend is away from
denying use of equitable estoppel against government, even
when it is performing a "governmental" function.

The trend

is toward applying the doctrine against public bodies where
the interests of justice, equity, or common fairness dictate.
Canfield v. Prof, 67 Cal. App.3d 722, 137 Cal. Rptr. 27
(1977); Gruber v. Mayor and Township Committee of the
Township of Raritan, 39 N.J. 1, 186 A.2d 489, 495

(1962).
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The modern cases hold that equitable estoppel may be applied
against the state acting in its governmental capacity.
City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 448
(1970}; Stahelin v. Board of Education, 87 Ill. App.2d 28,
230 N.W.2d 465 (1967).
The only precondition to applying the doctrine against
a state acting in a

11

governmental" capacity is that

the estoppel not impair governmental functions or proper
discharge of governmental duties.

Ford v. Bellingham-

Whatcum County Distric~ Board of Health, 83 Wash.2d 618,
521 P.2d 736 (1974).

Application of equitable estoppel

against Plaintiff-Respondent does not impair it in discharging
its duties.

Recovery in this case would defeat equity

and good conscience and thus result in manifest injustice.
POINT IV
AN INTERVIEW IN ENGLISH WHICH DETERMINED APPELLANT'S
ELIGIBILITY FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, BY AN ASSISTANCE
PAYMENTS ADMINISTRATION REPRESENTATIVE WHO SPOKE ONLY
ENGLISH AND WHO KNEW APPELLANT WAS LITERATE ONLY IN
SPANISH, WAS A VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION AFFORDED
BY THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
The protection afforded under the equal protection
guarantees was set forth by the Hawaii Supreme Court in
State v. Cotton, 516 P. 2d

715, 717 (1973).

In examining

the constitutionality of an ordinance requiring a motorcycle
operator to wear head protection equipment the court held:
The general principle stated by the courts in the
interpretation of the equal protection clause is
that all persons shall be treated alike under like
circumstances and conditions, both in privileges
conferred and in liabilities imposed.
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The California Supreme Court in Hawkins v. Superior
Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 586 P.2d
916, · 921 (1978), confronted the equal protection issue where ti
defendant was denied a postindictment preliminary hearing.
The court acknowledged the classical test for examining
whether the State has violated the equal protection clause.
The court stated:
Under the traditional two-tier test of equal
protection a discriminatory legislative classificati
that impairs fundamental rights will be subjected
to strict sqrutiny by the courts, and the state
will be required to bear the heavy burden of providing not only that it has a compelling interest
which justifies classification but also that
discrimination is necessary to promote that interest
Since the equal protection clause is applicable only to
State action, to establish a violation thereof, it is
necessary to show:
(1)

State action;

(2)

discriminatory classification;

(3)

impairment of fundamental rights; and

(4)

no compelling State interest.

In the present case State action is manifest in the
promulgation of Volume II of the Assistance Payments
Administration regulations for the State of Utah.

It is

Volume II that does not require the· Assistance Payments
Administration to conduct interviews in Spanish for nonEnglish speaking individuals to determine if they qualify
for financial assistance.

Since State action is involved

the first element to establish a violation of equal
protection is satisfied.
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The essence of aDy discriminatory classification finds
substance in its discriminatory effect.

A· law may appear to

be nondiscriminatory on its face; however, it is the discriminator
impact of that law upon a protected minority that renders it
illegal.

In

r.:e

Ia..Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d

45,

52 (9th

Cir. 1978), a case involving the alleged denial of equal
educational opportunities, the Court of Appeals held:
Discriminatory effect and its paraphrases simply
serve to capture the sense of differential, disparate, or disproportionate consequences which
facially nondiscriminatory laws, decision, or other
actions may have upon a member of a particular
protected minority and as such they operate only
to signal the beginning of the equal protection
analysis ....
Volume II of the Assistance Payment Administration
appears nondiscriminatory on its face.
goes into an Assistance

P~yment

When any individual

Administration Office to

apply for assistance, he is interviewed by an English
speaking representative.

It is the "discriminatory effect"

that an interview in English has upon the Spanish speaking
recipient whose literacy in English is limited that creates
the constitutional violation.

In order that he might under-

stand the contents of the interview the Spanish speaking
recipient is burdened with seeking out a translator.
recipient may be unable to obtain a translator.

The

If he does

not find one he £aces the risk of not being given aid or in
the alternative being given aid outside the regulations.
In any event the risk is great that because of the interview
being in English the Spanish speaking recipient may be denied
financial assistance without ever being able to communicate
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essential information to the Assistance Payments Administration
representative or in the alternative be given benefits
only to have an overpayment collection proceeding against
him later.
The discriminatory effect is therefore that the Spanish
speaking recipient is shouldered with the burden and expense
of seeking out a translator.

The English speaking recipient

is of course not faced with this problem.

If the Spanish

speaking recipient is unable to obtain a translator he
would probably be denied benefits or in the alternative be
granted benefits only to face legal action to collect those
benefits back at a later time.

The risk is substantial that

the recipient will suffer overpayment proceedings or denial
of aid.

The English speaking recipient is not faced with

these risks in receiving financial assistance.

Having,

therefore, established the discriminatory effect of Volume
II of the Assistance Payments Administration regulation, the
second element necessary to show a violation of equal protectim
has been met.
Absent a suspect classification, discriminatory State
action must impair a fundamental right to constitute a
violation of equal protection.
supra.

Hawkins v. Superior Court,

It is clear that when a person is denied financial

assistance, either outright or through subsequent overpayment
collection

~roceedings,

without an opportunity to present

the facts, fundamental due process rights have been impaired.
The critic al importance of financial assistance to a ·.)erson
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unemployed and injured and without any alternative source of
income is self-evident.

"Since he lacks independent resources

his situation becomes immediately desperate"
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254

(1970).

Goldberg

Until the recipient is able

build up his health and secure new employment, the general
welfare-food, clothing,

~ousing,

medical care, transportation,

for him and his family - is dependent upon the receipt of
financial assistance.
Discriminatory State action denying the

oppo~tunity

to

present one's case for financial assistance not only
impairs the right to exist, as secured through retention of
financial assistance benefits, but violates the most
fundamental right to due process.

Goldberg v. Kelly, supra.

Since due process is a fundamental right, the element of
State impairment of a fundamental right is satisfied.
Even though it has been established that Volume II
of the Assistance Payments Administration is State action,
discrimatory in nature, and impairing a fundamental right,
this regulation may not be violative of the equal protection
clause if it is justified by a compelling State interest.
Hawkins, supra.

The 9rimary State interest in this case

would be the cost of hiring Spanish speaking individuals to
conduct interviews with Spanish speaking individuals.
The State has a legitimate concern in preventing any
increase in its administrative budgets.

However, the number

of persons actually entitled to interviews in Spanish would
be comparatively few.

The cost to the State would therefore
-22-
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be minimal -- a liberal approximation would estimate the total
number of Mexican-Americans in the State of Utah at 60,000 or
6% of the total State population.

Interviews in Spanish wouldi

only be required for those persons identified in their
interview with an Assistance Payments

Ad!f!_~nistration

sentative as being literate only in Spanish.

repre-

The number of

Mexican-Americans falling into that category would be minimal.
In Goldberg, supra, the competing interests were quite
similar to the present case, i.e., cost to the state and
importance to the indfvidual in receiving public assistance.
The cost to the state in Goldberg was the expense in providing
the recipient a hearing.

That adminstrative cost Has vastly

greater than the cost to the State of Utah in Jiring Spanish
speaking individuals when required.

The United States

Supreme Court in Goldberg held:
The interest of the eligible recipient in the uninterpreted receipt of public assistance uhich provides him with essential food, clothing, housing
and medical care, coupled with the State's interest
that his payment not be erroneously terminated,
clearly outweighs the State's competing concern
to prevent any increase in its fiscal and administrative budgets.
Id. at 264-66.

The interest of the State in preventing any

increase in its budget does not rise to the level of a
compelling interest.

There are a multitude of ways that a

cost-conscious State agency can maintain a lean budget.

In

the present case the competing interest of the Spanish
speaking recipient and all other persons similarly situated
is too great a price to pay for one means of cost conservation.
All the essential elements have therefore been met to constitut
a violation of equal protection.
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CONCLUSION
~his

Brief assumes all of the facts that would be

necessary to support Respondent's position and shows that
even based on those facts

~espondent

is entitled to no

relief.
The Appellant during the time in question "occupied"
his home in Muleshoe, Texas, and was therefore eligible for
financial assistance because his home Has exempt under
Volume II Section 410.1 of the Utah Rules.
The interview in English which was conducted by the
Respondent with the Appellant, who is non-English speaking,
was a violation of the Utah and the United States Constituions.
Furthermore, the Respondent is estopped from collecting any
overpayments to· Appellant, if in fact there v1ere any.
More compelling is an analysis of the competing State

I

and private interests.

The number of Spanish speaking recipientsi

justifying interviews in the Spanish language would be
relatively minimal.

The small percentage of Mexican-Americans

living within the State of Utah coupled with small percentage
of Mexican-Americans requiring interviews in Spanish uecause
of their limited literacy in English along with the low
welfare

r~te

less than 3% justifies

th~se

conslusions.

~on-

sequently the cost to the State would be comparatively low.
In contrast the nature of the interest to the recipient
is critical.

AFDC benefits may likely be the recipient's

sole source of income and support for him and his family.
balancing of the interests weighs heavily in favor of the
recipient.

Goldberg v. Kelly,

supra.
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A

~he

Appellant having been erroneously subjected to a

collection proceeding, improperly denied adequate notice and
an opportunity to present the facts properly to

Respondent

t~e

in the interview, brings us to the conclusion that Appellant
should not be the subject of collection proceedings any
longer.
Respectfully submitted this Jilgd.ay of

,...~

1980.
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorney for Appellant
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